No importa tu meta, preocupate de disfrutar el camino
Este blog es solo...
un vómito de pensamientos, de esos que se esconden dentro de mi, pero no pueden ser lanzados por mi lengua.
lunes, 26 de agosto de 2013
IV. Fit Drives Both Competitive Advantage and Sustainability
Positioning choices determine not only which
activities a company will perform and how it
will configure individual activities but also how
activities relate to one another. While operational
effectiveness is about achieving excellence in individual
activities, or functions, strategy is about
combining activities.
Southwest’s rapid gate turnaround, which allows
frequent departures and greater use of aircraft, is
essential to its high-convenience, low-cost positioning.
But how does Southwest achieve it? Part
of the answer lies in the company’s well-paid gate
and ground crews, whose productivity in turnarounds
is enhanced by flexible union rules. But the
bigger part of the answer lies in how Southwest
performs other activities. With no meals, no
seat assignment, and no interline baggage transfers,
Southwest avoids having to perform activities
that slow down other airlines. It selects airports
and routes to avoid congestion that introduces
delays. Southwest’s strict limits on the type and
length of routes make standardized aircraft possible:
every aircraft Southwest turns is a Boeing 737.
What is Southwest’s core competence? Its key
success factors? The correct answer is that everything
matters. Southwest’s strategy involves a
whole system of activities, not a collection of parts.
Its competitive advantage comes from the way its
activities fit and reinforce one another.
Fit locks out imitators by creating a chain that is
as strong as its strongest link. As in most companies
with good strategies, Southwest’s activities
complement one another in ways that create real
economic value. One activity’s cost, for example, is
lowered because of the way other activities are performed.
Similarly, one activity’s value to customers
can be enhanced by a company’s other activities.
That is the way strategic fit creates competitive
advantage and superior profitability.
Types of Fit
The importance of fit among functional policies
is one of the oldest ideas in strategy. Gradually,
however, it has been supplanted on the management
agenda. Rather than seeing the company as
a whole, managers have turned to “core” competencies,
“critical” resources, and “key” success factors.
In fact, fit is a far more central component of
competitive advantage than most realize.
Fit is important because discrete activities often
affect one another. A sophisticated sales force, for
example, confers a greater advantage
when the company’s product
embodies premium technology and
its marketing approach emphasizes
customer assistance and support.
A production line with high levels
of model variety is more valuable
when combined with an inventory
and order processing system that
minimizes the need for stocking finished goods,
a sales process equipped to explain and encourage
customization, and an advertising theme that
stresses the benefits of product variations that
meet a customer’s special needs. Such complementarities
are pervasive in strategy. Although some
mine its reputation – if it delivers another kind of
value or attempts to deliver two inconsistent
things at the same time. For example, Ivory soap,
with its position as a basic, inexpensive everyday
soap would have a hard time reshaping its image to
match Neutrogena’s premium “medical” reputation.
Efforts to create a new image typically cost
tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars in a
major industry–a powerful barrier to imitation.
Second, and more important, trade-offs arise
from activities themselves. Different positions
(with their tailored activities) require different
product configurations, different equipment, different
employee behavior, different skills, and different
management systems. Many trade-offs reflect
inflexibilities in machinery, people, or systems.
The more Ikea has configured its activities to
lower costs by having its customers do their own
assembly and delivery, the less able it is to satisfy
customers who require higher levels of service.
However, trade-offs can be even more basic. In
general, value is destroyed if an activity is overdesigned
or underdesigned for its use. For example,
even if a given salesperson were capable of providing
a high level of assistance to one customer and
none to another, the salesperson’s talent (and some
of his or her cost) would be wasted on the second
customer. Moreover, productivity can improve
when variation of an activity is limited. By providing
a high level of assistance all the time, the salesperson
and the entire sales activity can often
achieve efficiencies of learning and scale.
Finally, trade-offs arise from limits on internal
coordination and control. By clearly choosing to
compete in one way and not another,
senior management makes organizational
priorities clear. Companies
that try to be all things to all customers,
in contrast, risk confusion in
the trenches as employees attempt
to make day-to-day operating decisions
without a clear framework.
Positioning trade-offs are pervasive
in competition and essential to
strategy. They create the need for
choice and purposefully limit what a company offers.
They deter straddling or repositioning, because
competitors that engage in those approaches undermine
their strategies and degrade the value of their
existing activities.
Trade-offs ultimately grounded Continental Lite.
The airline lost hundreds of millions of dollars, and
the CEO lost his job. Its planes were delayed leaving
congested hub cities or slowed at the gate by
baggage transfers. Late flights and cancellations
generated a thousand complaints a day. Continental
Lite could not afford to compete on price and
still pay standard travel-agent commissions, but
neither could it do without agents for its fullservice
business. The airline compromised by cutting
commissions for all Continental flights across
the board. Similarly, it could not afford to offer the
same frequent-flier benefits to travelers paying the
much lower ticket prices for Lite service. It compromised
again by lowering the rewards of Continental’s
entire frequent-flier program. The results:
angry travel agents and full-service customers.
Continental tried to compete in two ways at
once. In trying to be low cost on some routes and
full service on others, Continental paid an enormous
straddling penalty. If there were no trade-offs
between the two positions, Continental could have
succeeded. But the absence of trade-offs is a dangerous
half-truth that managers must unlearn. Quality
is not always free. Southwest’s convenience, one
kind of high quality, happens to be consistent with
low costs because its frequent departures are facilitated
by a number of low-cost practices – fast gate
turnarounds and automated ticketing, for example.
However, other dimensions of airline quality – an
assigned seat, a meal, or baggage transfer – require
costs to provide.
In general, false trade-offs between cost and quality
occur primarily when there is redundant or
wasted effort, poor control or accuracy, or weak coordination.
Simultaneous improvement of cost and
differentiation is possible only when a company begins
far behind the productivity frontier or when
the frontier shifts outward. At the frontier, where
companies have achieved current best practice, the
trade-off between cost and differentiation is very
real indeed.
After a decade of enjoying productivity advantages,
Honda Motor Company and Toyota Motor
Corporation recently bumped up against the frontier.
In 1995, faced with increasing customer resistance
to higher automobile prices, Honda found
that the only way to produce a less-expensive car
was to skimp on features. In the United States,
III. A Sustainable Strategic Position Requires Trade-offs
Choosing a unique position, however, is not
enough to guarantee a sustainable advantage. A
valuable position will attract imitation by incumbents,
who are likely to copy it in one of two ways.
First, a competitor can reposition itself to match
the superior performer. J.C. Penney, for instance,
has been repositioning itself from a Sears clone to a
more upscale, fashion-oriented, soft-goods retailer.
A second and far more common type of imitation is
straddling. The straddler seeks to match the benefits
of a successful position while maintaining its
existing position. It grafts new features, services, or
technologies onto the activities it already performs.
For those who argue that competitors can copy
any market position, the airline industry is a perfect
test case. It would seem that nearly any competitor
could imitate any other airline’s activities.
Any airline can buy the same planes, lease the
gates, and match the menus and ticketing and baggage
handling services offered by other airlines.
Continental Airlines saw how well Southwest
was doing and decided to straddle. While maintaining
its position as a full-service airline, Continental
also set out to match Southwest on a number
of point-to-point routes. The airline dubbed
the new service Continental Lite. It eliminated
meals and first-class service, increased departure
frequency, lowered fares, and shortened turnaround
time at the gate. Because Continental remained
a full-service airline on other routes, it continued to
use travel agents and its mixed fleet of planes and
to provide baggage checking and seat assignments.
But a strategic position is not sustainable unless
there are trade-offs with other positions. Trade-offs
occur when activities are incompatible. Simply
put, a trade-off means that more of one thing necessitates
less of another. An airline can choose to
serve meals – adding cost and slowing turnaround
time at the gate – or it can choose not to, but it cannot
do both without bearing major inefficiencies.
Trade-offs create the need for choice and protect
against repositioners and straddlers. Consider Neutrogena
soap. Neutrogena Corporation’s varietybased
positioning is built on a “kind to the skin,”
residue-free soap formulated for pH balance. With
a large detail force calling on dermatologists, Neutrogena’s
marketing strategy looks more like a drug
company’s than a soap maker’s. It advertises in
medical journals, sends direct mail to doctors, attends
medical conferences, and performs research
at its own Skincare Institute. To reinforce its positioning,
Neutrogena originally focused its distribution
on drugstores and avoided price promotions.
Neutrogena uses a slow, more expensive manufacturing
process to mold its fragile soap.
In choosing this position, Neutrogena said no to
the deodorants and skin softeners that many customers
desire in their soap. It gave up the largevolume
potential of selling through supermarkets
and using price promotions. It sacrificed manufacturing
efficiencies to achieve the soap’s desired attributes.
In its original positioning, Neutrogena
made a whole raft of trade-offs like those, trade-offs
that protected the company from imitators.
Trade-offs arise for three reasons. The first is inconsistencies
in image or reputation. A company
known for delivering one kind of value may lack
credibility and confuse customers – or even under
why is strategy
It is intuitive for most managers to conceive of
their business in terms of the customers’ needs
they are meeting. But a critical element of needsbased
positioning is not at all intuitive and is often
overlooked. Differences in needs will not translate
into meaningful positions unless the best set of
activities to satisfy them also differs. If that were
not the case, every competitor could meet those
same needs, and there would be nothing unique or
valuable about the positioning.
In private banking, for example, Bessemer Trust
Company targets families with a minimum of
$5 million in investable assets who want capital
preservation combined with wealth accumulation.
By assigning one sophisticated account officer for
every 14 families, Bessemer has configured its activities
for personalized service. Meetings, for example,
are more likely to be held at a client’s ranch
or yacht than in the office. Bessemer offers a wide
array of customized services, including investment
management and estate administration, oversight
of oil and gas investments, and accounting for racehorses
and aircraft. Loans, a staple of most private
banks, are rarely needed by Bessemer’s clients and
make up a tiny fraction of its client balances and
income. Despite the most generous compensation
of account officers and the highest personnel cost
as a percentage of operating expenses, Bessemer’s
differentiation with its target families produces a
return on equity estimated to be the highest of any
private banking competitor.
Citibank’s private bank, on the other hand,
serves clients with minimum assets of about
$250,000 who, in contrast to Bessemer’s clients,
want convenient access to loans–from jumbo mortgages
to deal financing. Citibank’s account managers
are primarily lenders. When clients need other
services, their account manager refers them to
other Citibank specialists, each of whom handles
prepackaged products. Citibank’s system is less
customized than Bessemer’s and allows it to have a
lower manager-to-client ratio of 1:125. Biannual office
meetings are offered only for the largest clients.
Both Bessemer and Citibank have tailored their activities
to meet the needs of a different group of private
banking customers. The same value chain cannot
profitably meet the needs of both groups.
The third basis for positioning is that of segmenting
customers who are accessible in different
ways. Although their needs are similar to those of
other customers, the best configuration of activities
to reach them is different. I call this accessbased
positioning. Access can be a function of customer
geography or customer scale – or of anything
that requires a different set of activities to reach
customers in the best way.
Segmenting by access is less common and less
well understood than the other two bases. Carmike
Cinemas, for example, operates movie theaters exclusively
in cities and towns with populations under
200,000. How does Carmike make money in
markets that are not only small but also won’t support
big-city ticket prices? It does so through a set
of activities that result in a lean cost structure.
Carmike’s small-town customers can be served
through standardized, low-cost theater complexes
requiring fewer screens and less sophisticated projection
technology than big-city theaters. The company’s
proprietary information system and management
process eliminate the need for local administrative
staff beyond a single theater manager.
Carmike also reaps advantages from centralized
purchasing, lower rent and payroll costs (because of
its locations), and rock-bottom corporate overhead
of 2% (the industry average is 5%). Operating in
small communities also allows Carmike to practice
a highly personal form of marketing in which
the theater manager knows patrons and promotes
attendance through personal contacts. By being the
dominant if not the only theater in its markets–the
main competition is often the high school football
team – Carmike is also able to get its pick of films
and negotiate better terms with distributors.
Rural versus urban-based customers are one example
of access driving differences in activities.
Serving small rather than large customers or densely
rather than sparsely situated customers are other
examples in which the best way to configure marketing,
order processing, logistics, and after-sale
service activities to meet the similar needs of distinct
groups will often differ.
Positioning is not only about carving out a niche.
A position emerging from any of the sources can be
broad or narrow. A focused competitor, such as
Ikea, targets the special needs of a subset of customers
and designs its activities accordingly. Focused
competitors thrive on groups of customers
who are overserved (and hence overpriced) by more
broadly targeted competitors, or underserved (and
hence underpriced). A broadly targeted competitor–
for example, Vanguard or Delta Air Lines – serves
a wide array of customers, performing a set of activities
designed to meet their common needs. It
ignores or meets only partially the more idiosyncratic
needs of particular customer groups.
Whatever the basis – variety, needs, access, or
some combination of the three – positioning requires
a tailored set of activities because it is always
a function of differences on the supply side;
that is, of differences in activities. However, positioning
is not always a function of differences on
the demand, or customer, side. Variety and access
positionings, in particular, do not rely on any customer
differences. In practice, however, variety or
access differences often accompany needs differences.
The tastes – that is, the needs – of Carmike’s
small-town customers, for instance, run more toward
comedies, Westerns, action films, and family
entertainment. Carmike does not run any films
rated NC-17.
Having defined positioning, we can now begin to
answer the question, “What is strategy?” Strategy
is the creation of a unique and valuable position, involving
a different set of activities. If there were
only one ideal position, there would be no need
for strategy. Companies would face a simple imperative
– win the race to discover and preempt it. The
essence of strategic positioning is to choose activities
that are different from rivals’. If the same
set of activities were best to produce all varieties,
meet all needs, and access all customers, companies
could easily shift among them and operational effectiveness
would determine performance.
lunes, 27 de mayo de 2013
Solo no se puede
Amigos desde hace mucho, todo se fue como arena entre los dedos, he tratado de saber de ti sin respuesta. Espero algún día me contestes y al menos me valores como alguna vez lo hiciste, que el tiempo no sea excusa solo para pasar a saludar al menos, que al menos vuelva a tener un poquito de importancia en tu vida. Solo eso.
martes, 23 de abril de 2013
A mi manera
¿Pero qué es un hombre? ¿Qué es lo que ha conseguido? si no es a sí mismo, entonces tiene nada.
sábado, 13 de abril de 2013
domingo, 7 de abril de 2013
Quizás
Quizás no sea el mejor, pero de seguro no soy el peor. Cada día lo intento todo para ser mejor y eso es lo importante, me importa más el resto que yo mismo, quizás eso es lo malo en mi.
miércoles, 20 de marzo de 2013
Externalidades.
Quisiera ser breve, tal vez lo sea. Solo dejaré que fluya. Sé que no soy buena persona, solo no soy una mala persona. No desmerezco a mis amigos para nadas, tengo poquisimos. Me gustaría disfrutarlos a todos, pero no se puede, siempre hay excusa por parte de algunos, falta de tiempo o mil cosas más.
Creo tener razón al pensar en que está bien en que no siempre se puede tener lo que se quiere, en el caso de las amistades... bueno es como lo mismo, no siempre puedes tener a tus amigos cuando quieres, pero finalmente es peor mi caso y es lo que me destruye de a poco. A mi no me complica tanto no ver a mis amigos, finalmente siempre he tenido una vida muy solitaria, por lo cual se vivir conmigo mismo. El problema es cuando se genera expectativa. SI USTED NO PUEDE CUMPLIR NO SE COMPROMETA, esa es la frase que me hace eco en la cabeza. Si no me puede ver, no me diga que nos juntemos, si despues va a salir a ultima hora con que no. Una vez es aceptable, dos veces quizas, tres veces parezco hueon creyendo y cuatro veces ya no me queda felicidad. La verdad los amigos son para disfrutarlos y todo eso. A pesar de que he andado muy positivo este ultimo tiempo (no queda otra) hay cosas que me desalientan y me dan lata, porque finalmente tengo amigos que me dañan aunque no lo quieran.
lunes, 11 de febrero de 2013
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